Abstract: Using a New Keynesian framework, this paper shows that, under optimal discretion and optimal pre-commitment in a timeless perspective, imperfect transparency about the relative weight that the central bank assigns to output-gap stabilization generally reduces the average reaction of inflation to inflation shocks and the volatility of inflation, but increases these of the output gap in static and dynamic terms, and more so when inflation shocks are highly persistent. On balance, when inflation shocks are not excessively persistent, opacity could improve social welfare, more likely under pre-commitment than under discretion, if the weight assigned to output-gap stabilization is low.
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Introduction
Since the seminal work of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) , the issues of central bank transparency have been largely examined in all its aspects across different types of models.
Theoretical and empirical studies show that central bank transparency is in general desirable because it can improve private inflation expectations, leading to better economic decisions and thus higher social welfare, even though opacity could be desirable in the presence of large distortions.
1 In practice, more and more central banks, abandoning the tradition of secrecy since the middle-1990s, are adopting higher and higher standards in political, economic, procedural, policy and operational transparency.
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This trend is closely related to the move towards more central bank independence across the world. Improved transparency, by increasing the accountability and hence enhancing the public support for central bank independence, is likely to reduce political influence over monetary policy. In this context, the rise of New Keynesian models emphasizing the importance of forward-looking expectations in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy reinforces the perception among economists and central bankers that transparency can potentially improve the anchoring of inflation expectations and therefore the trade-off between inflation and output-gap stabilization.
In the New Keynesian framework, the public's expectation about the future path of monetary policy becomes an important determinant of current economic conditions, with important implications for central bank transparency. In this framework, considering monetary delegation issues, Walsh (2003a) has shown that the optimal inflation target weight is decreasing in the variance of the target around inflation adjusted for cost shocks. Jensen 1 The literature on central bank transparency is related to the broad literature on the issue of monetary uncertainty first emphasized by the important contribution of Brainard (1967) . For a recent survey of the literature on central bank transparency, see Blinder et al. (2008) , Crowe and Meade (2008) , Geraats (2009) , Eichengreen (2007, 2010) , and Eijffinger and van der Cruijsen (2010) . 2 This corresponds to the five motives for central bank transparency defined in Geraats (2002) .
2 (2002) finds that transparency about a control error may be disadvantageous if the central bank enjoys low-inflation credibility, and there is need for active monetary stabilization policy. In Eijffinger and Tesfaselassie (2007) , if the central bank's targets are common knowledge, disclosure of the central bank's private information about future shocks impairs stabilization of current inflation and output. Walsh (2007a) shows that more-accurate central bank forecasts of demand (cost) shocks reduce (increase) optimal transparency about shortrun targets. Under optimal discretion, Westelius (2009) proves that, when the degree of persistence of an output target shock is the central bank's private information, perfect transparency amplifies the dynamic adjustments of inflation and the output gap and unambiguously increases inflation and output volatility, reducing thus welfare. Examining the optimal combination of central bank independence and conservatism, Hefeker and Zimmer (2011a) conclude that uncertain central bank preferences imply that full independence is no longer optimal. Li et al. (2010) suggest that transparency about the central bank's preference for model robustness could actually reduce macroeconomic volatility. While an inflation targeting regime with non-linear contract might provide some incentives for the central bank to be opaque about its preference for the model robustness in order to become more independent vis-à-vis the government, this is not the case with optimal linear inflation contract Spyromitros, 2010, 2012) .
This paper contributes to the literature on central bank transparency by examining the static and dynamic effects of transparency about the central bank's preferences under optimal discretion and pre-commitment in a standard New-Keynesian model. The current consensus obtained in the Barro-Gordon framework is that imperfect transparency about central bank preferences has no significant effect on the average inflation and output gap and will increase inflation and output-gap volatility (Geraats, 2002) . However, while it is common to see many 3 central banks announcing their inflation target, there is, to our knowledge, no central bank having produced a public statement clarifying the weights that it puts on its objectives.
Knowledge of the relative weight assigned to the output-gap target is essential for evaluating how quickly the central bank plans to steer the economy back to the inflation target following a cost shock. The larger is this weight, the longer the time period allowed by the central bank to get back to the inflation target, and correspondingly the smaller is the volatility of output. Therefore, part of the opacity regarding the central bank's objectives might be explained by the fact that, in New Keynesian models, inflationary expectations affect current pricing decisions, inciting a flexible inflation targeter with a non-negligible flexibility parameter to appear less flexible than he really is.
According to Cukierman (2009) , one reason explaining this lack of transparency is the difficulty of agreeing once and for all on a value of these parameters representing the median or average position of the committee, and the risk of dissents among committee members who collectively make monetary policy decisions; another one is the formidable task involved in precise measurement of potential output and the output gap that enters the loss function, which may lead the policymaker (even a unitary policymaker) to shy away from formulating a precise value for preference parameters.
The main objective of the paper is to show if the static and dynamic effects of uncertain central bank preferences in a standard New Keynesian framework emphasizing forwardlylooking expectations could account for such behaviors of central bankers. Our study helps to understand the difference of effects of central bank transparency across economic models. It is particularly interesting because, according to Cukierman (2002) (Demertzis and Hughes Hallet, 2007; Geraats, 2009; Eichengreen, 2007 and van der Cruijsen et al., 2010; Spyromitros and Tuysuz, 2012) , which, while in most cases showing the positive effect of transparency on macroeconomic performance, do not go far enough, due to lack of data, so as to appreciate the effects of uncertainty about the relative weight that central banks assign to output-gap stabilization.
The present study is closely related to the works of Nolan and Schaling (1998), Eijffinger et al. (2000) , Faust and Svensson (2001) , Jensen (2003) , and Demertzis and Hughes Hallet (2007) among others. Using the static Barro-Gordon framework, they show that imperfect transparency about central bank preferences is detrimental to social welfare when corrections are made for the effects due to arbitrary specifications of uncertainty about one or the other parameter attached to the central bank's objectives. Of great relevance to this paper, with regard to its theoretical conclusions, are models introducing distortions through the wage setting behavior of labor unions (e.g.. Sorensen, 1991; Grüner, 2002, Spyromitros and Zimmer, 2006) , or distortionary taxes (Hughes Hallett and Viegi, 2003; Ciccarone et al., 2007; Hefeker and Zimmer, 2011b) , or/and public investment (Dai and Sidiropoulos, 2011 ).
In models with distortions, central bank opacity could improve welfare because it could discipline the private sector or the government when setting wages or tax rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the basic model. In the section after, we solve the model under discretion and examine the effects of opacity about central bank preferences on the level and volatility of macroeconomic 5 variables and the dynamics of inflation expectations. In section 4, we investigate the same issues when the monetary policy is conducted under optimal pre-commitment in a timeless perspective. Section 5 compares the static and dynamic effects of opacity under these two policy regimes. The last section concludes.
The model
The description of the economic environment follows the standard New-Keynesian model based on optimizing private sector behaviour and nominal rigidities that has been extensively used in the recent literature on monetary policy (Clarida et al. 1999 ). The economy is characterized by a forward-looking Phillips curve: e an inflation or cost-push shock.  is the household's subjective discount factor, which is positive but less than unity. The composite parameter  is the output-gap elasticity of inflation and captures the effects of the gap on real marginal costs and marginal cost on inflation. More precisely, ) 1 (
, where  is the fraction of firms keeping their prices constant in period t , and ) 1 (   characterizes the linear relation between the real marginal costs and the output gap.
We assume that the inflation shock is serially correlated and follows an AR(1) process:
where t  has a zero mean and is serially uncorrelated, and  represents the degree of persistence of inflation shocks.
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In an economy characterized by equation (1), monetary policy affects current inflation and the output gap through two channels. The first is the policy rule (or direct) channel. In effect, the implied price inertia of the model enables monetary authorities to manipulate the real interest rate through the variation in the nominal interest rate, affecting the aggregate demand, and hence inflation and the output gap. The second is the inflation expectations (or indirect) channel. Acknowledging that monetary policy affects the expected future stream of output gaps and inflations, some firms will modify their prices today in anticipating that they may be unable to adjust prices in the future, causing current inflation to vary.
Because the forward-looking property of the New Keynesian Phillips curve is a very important channel for monetary policy, it is also essential for the impact of political transparency. The standard Barro-Gordon framework, which is largely used in the literature on the central bank transparency, only allows analyzing the direct and indirect effects of transparency in the conduct of current monetary policy, but does not capture the effects of transparency operating through the public's perception of future policy. This perception is dynamic by nature and cannot be elicited in the Barro-Gordon model.
It is therefore insightful to examine the implications of such a perception for political transparency in Clarida et al. (1999) when the issue of transparency is addressed by use of the CB's objective function employed in the traditional literature on transparency. The central bank is assumed to minimize a standard objective function which is quadratic in deviations of inflation and the output gap from their respective zero target levels:
where  is the expected relative weight placed on the output-gap objective,  the central bank's discount factor. The weights assigned by the central bank to inflation and output-gap stabilization are more or less predictable by the private sector, meaning that  is a stochastic 7 variable. The formulation according to which  is associated with both inflation and outputgap objectives is adopted to avoid the arbitrary effects of central bank preference uncertainty on average monetary policy (Beetsma and Jensen, 2003) . The distribution of
In the following, we will first determine the solutions of equilibrium and then examine the static and dynamic effects of central bank opacity.
The equilibrium
The difference equation in t  given by (5) and (23) 
where
. Using the second-order Taylor approximation and taking account of opacity, we obtain 2 ) (
and using (4) and (5), we get
3 The appendices are available upon request.
, and the second-order Taylor approximation of its expected value is given as 2 ) (
The variances of inflation and the output gap are obtained using (8) and (9) as: Hereafter, we will examine the effects of imperfect transparency on the equilibrium and dynamics of the economy under monetary policy discretion in distinguishing serially uncorrelated and correlated inflation shocks.
The equilibrium effects of central bank opacity
Central bank opacity indirectly affects the level of inflation and the output gap through its effects on inflation expectations. It affects the variance of these variables both through the 10 inflation expectations (or indirect) channel and the policy rule (or direct) channel. The latter corresponds to the fact that the shocks affecting central bank preferences modify the trade-off between inflation and the output gap, i.e., the slope of the monetary policy rule given by equation (4), and hence the reactions of inflation and the output gap to inflation shocks, leading to a change of their respective volatilities. To distinguish the respective effects due to these two channels, we first consider the case of serially uncorrelated inflation shocks, where the expected future inflation is zero, and then the case of serially correlated inflation shocks. 
The case of serially uncorrelated inflation shocks
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Imperfect transparency does not affect inflation and the output gap through the inflation expectations channel because the expected inflation rate is always equal to zero when inflation shocks are serially uncorrelated. However, the reactions of inflation and the output gap to inflation shocks are directly affected by unpredictable preference shocks and hence their average reactions are affected by opacity through the policy rule channel. In effect, given , it is straightforward to see that, for such effects on average inflation and output gap to disappear (or to be inversed), the output-gap elasticity of inflation  must be equal to (or greater than) unity. According to equation (4), the optimal trade-off between inflation and the output gap must verify
, where  corresponds to the rate of transformation between inflation and the output gap. Inserting the latter equation into the previous condition yields:
Equation (12) illustrates why 1   is a critical threshold. In effect, for 1   , the optimal trade-off condition (12) will be the same as in the case of full transparency and thus imperfect transparency will not affect the average equilibrium.
, the preference shocks stochastically affect the slope of the policy rule. To appreciate its average impact on the policy rule (4), we use the latter to compute
represent the average value of inflation and the output gap. Given that Given the empirical studies on the New Keynesian Phillips curve reporting low values for  , these are less likely situations.
As inflation shocks are serially uncorrelated, central bank opacity will affect the volatility of inflation and the output gap only through the policy rule channel. The effects of opacity on macroeconomic volatility depend on the output-gap elasticity of inflation (  ) and the expected relative weight assigned to output-gap stabilization (  ). Given that the parameter  is generally small, only a very low value for  could make possible the condition
It is to notice that the condition
, allowing thus opacity to increase the volatility of inflation.
The latter might not significantly increase when  becomes small because the degree of opacity is limited by the value of  according to Ciccarone et al. (2007) . Nevertheless, the central bank will have a greater incentive to be more transparent if it attributes a very low value to  so that
, since in this case more transparency will reduce the volatility of inflation while mitigating the volatility of the output gap. This result is consistent with the empirical observation according to which the current trend of increased transparency amongst 14 central banks appears to have occurred simultaneously with an increased emphasis on price stability (Cukierman, 2002) .
The case of serially correlated inflation shocks
This is the case where 1 0    . Given that the numerical values set for the parameter  in New Keynesian models are generally very small, we consider only the case where 1   when examining the effect of opacity on the level and volatility of inflation and the output gap. Deriving twice (8) and (9) When inflation shocks are persistent, future expected inflation rate will be different from zero since it reflects both the implications of current inflation shocks for future inflations and the reactions of the central bank to these shocks. Using equation (7), we find that
, implying that an increase in central bank opacity will induce the private sector to adjust less its inflation expectations in response to the current inflation shock. This in turn will incite the central bank to reduce the responses of inflation rate (and hence the output gap) to inflation shocks. Since a high degree of persistence of inflation shocks will increase inflation expectations, it will increase the role of opacity and hence will amplify attenuation effects of a decrease in transparency on the expected inflation. The presence of serially correlated inflation shocks implies, under opacity, a weaker response of inflation and the output gap to the inflation shock for a given central bank 15 preference shock if the output-gap elasticity of the inflation is lower than unity. This result is independent of the initial degree of opacity.
Deriving (8) and (9) 
Examining (13) and (14), we obtain the following propositions.
Proposition 3a. Under optimal discretion, an increase in opacity will induce a decrease in the average reaction of inflation and an increase in the average reaction of the output gap to a serially correlated inflation shock for
The marginal effects reported in Proposition 3a will be less important with the increase in the initial degree of opacity but will be amplified by an increase in the persistence of inflation shocks. In effect, an increase in the degree of persistence will induce a higher expected future inflation rate according to equation (7), implying that opacity will generally have a great role to play in reducing the expected inflation rate and hence will make a larger impact on inflation and the output gap on average. An increase in the degree of persistence reinforces the effect of opacity on the output gap if the initial degree of persistence is sufficiently low. To ensure that the condition given in the 16 proposition is verified for positive values of  , the initial degree of opacity must be sufficiently low, such that
, which is verified for positive 2   only if the weight assigned to output-gap stabilization is sufficiently high, i.e.
2    . In contrast, an increase in the initial degree of opacity will generally weaken the marginal effects of opacity on the average reactions of both variables to inflation shocks.
Deriving twice the variances of inflation and the output gap given by (10) and (11) 
In (15) and (16), the degrees of persistence and opacity interact, implying that the marginal effect of an increase in opacity will depend on the initial levels of  and 2   . In the following, in order to obtain some clear-cut conditions, we only consider the case where the initial equilibrium is characterized by full transparency.
Proposition 4. Under optimal discretion, beginning with an initial equilibrium with full transparency, an increase in opacity will induce a lower inflation volatility if
. It will increase the volatility of the output gap if
According to equations (15) and (16) A higher degree of opacity decreases (increases) the costs of achieving a higher level of output-gap (inflation). It has thus smoothing effects on inflation but the opposite effects on the output gap. These effects are stronger when the trade-off between inflation and the output gap is high (i.e., when the inflation shock is more persistent and the weight assigned to output-gap stabilization is lower) than when the trade-off is low.
The results reported in Proposition 4 are quite limited by the fact that, in order to derive some analytical conditions, we assume that the initial degree of opacity is zero. More while the second term in both equations is negative. Furthermore, it is straightforward to observe that all terms in (15) and (16) are increasing (in absolute value) in  . Thus, an increase in  will always reinforce the negative effect of opacity on the volatility of inflation and the output gap while it is unclear how the marginal effect of opacity on both variances vary with the initial degree of opacity. Some simulation exercises (see Table 1 
The dynamic effects of central bank transparency
In the above, we have determined the equilibrium solution of 
Taking the mathematical expectations of the equivalent of (18) for all future periods and iteratively substituting future inflation expectations leads to the general solution of
We observe that it is the value of ) (  However, when a persistent inflation shock hits the economy or a future event at time T is immediately known (i.e., a preannounced future policy or a known future shock), the expected inflation rate will begin to evolve from time t until the steady state is reached.
Consequently, the dynamic effects of such a current shock or future event will be affected by imperfect central bank transparency through the term ) (  t . An increase in opacity reduces the value of ) (  t  for 1   and hence accelerates, during the transition period until the equilibrium is reached, the convergence speed of the expected future inflation rate to its long term trend. The latter is equal to zero given that the inflation target of the central bank is zero.
An alternative way to consider the convergence issue is to examine the expected eigenvalue of the inflation dynamic equation (5), which is given by 1 ) ( ) (
, with its second-order Taylor approximation as
Since the inflation is a forward-looking variable, for the system to be stable, its eigenvalue  and hence its expected eigenvalue ) (  t must be outside the unit circle.
Deriving the expected eigenvalue ) (  t with respect to
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According to (20), ) (  t is greater when the degree of opacity increases. Therefore, imperfect transparency ensures a more rapid convergence of inflation expectations to their equilibrium level whenever the economy is perturbed by a current shock or foreseeable future exogenous or policy shocks, while not affecting the stability properties of the inflation dynamics.
In effect, according to equations (4) and (18), for a given shock affecting central bank preferences (  ), a faster dynamic adjustment of inflation expectations also implies that inflation and the output gap adjust more quickly. Departing from the benchmark case where the central bank is perfectly transparent, an increase in opacity will allow, on average, the central bank to reduce the reaction of inflation and the output gap to inflation shocks. A smaller response of optimal monetary policy makes the system converge more rapidly to the equilibrium. A quicker dynamic adjustment implies that the economy will shortly stay in each state of disequilibrium, implying less negative consequences for social welfare. However, when analyzing the effects of opacity on inflation and the output gap, one must also take account of the direct effects of the central bank's preference shocks by computing 22 the average responses of inflation and the output gap. As shown in equations (13) and (14) and in Propositions 2, 3a and 3b, an increase in opacity will accelerate the dynamic adjustment of inflation and the output gap through the inflation expectations channel but have opposite effects through the policy rule channel. Under the assumption that 1   , shocks on central bank preferences will accelerate on average the adjustment of inflation but decrease that of the output gap during the transition to the steady state equilibrium (Figure 2) . Nevertheless, the possible dynamic costs of preference shocks for the society through the policy rule channel could be dominated by the dynamic positive effect of opacity on social welfare through the inflation expectations channel. It is more likely if the weight assigned to the output-gap stabilization relative to the inflation stabilization is low.
Optimal monetary policy under pre-commitment in a timeless perspective
Optimal monetary policy can also be characterized by commitment. Under optimal commitment, the central bank chooses at time t both current and expected future values of inflation and the output gap and it takes advantage of the forward-looking nature of inflation expectations through the introduction of policy inertia. Optimal pre-commitment generally leads to higher social welfare than under discretion since the latter, but, while eliminating the inflation bias, it could generate a stabilization bias. To successfully affect inflation expectations, the commitment to a future path of policy needs to be credible. Thus, central bank transparency would appear to be a prerequisite for such a strategy. However, we are not certain that imperfect transparency adds a supplementary and welfare-reducing constraint to the central bank's optimization problem under commitment in the New Keynesian framework which emphasizes the forward-looking behavior of the price setters. 23 We consider that the central bank can credibly commit to future policies. More specifically, we will consider that the central bank adopts a timeless perspective in optimal pre-commitment monetary policy rule to eliminate the dynamic inconsistency.
In the following, we first present equilibrium solutions. We then examine the effects of imperfect transparency on the level and variance of macroeconomic variables before investigating its effect on the dynamic adjustment.
Equilibrium
Under commitment monetary policy, private sector's inflation expectations are not taken as given but are instead considered as variables that can be influenced by monetary authorities to achieve policy objectives. Optimal monetary policy under commitment is obtained by minimizing (3) subject to (1) for all periods t ,
, …, n t  . The first-order conditions of this minimization problem can be rearranged to yield:
The time inconsistency of the commitment solution becomes evident when comparing (21) and (22), since (21) places a requirement that is specific to the current period and is different from the corresponding requirement (22) for later periods.
The timeless perspective resolution (Woodford, 1999) to the problem of the time inconsistency of optimal policy consists for the policymaker to respect the optimality conditions derived above, except for the current period when the optimization takes place.
This amounts to using (22) also for the current period and neglecting (21), yielding the commitment optimality condition:
See also Clarida et al. (1999), and McCallum and Nelson (2004) .
The dynamic system in t x and t  defined by (1) and (23) 
Following McCallum and Nelson (2004) , and taking account of the uncertainty about central bank preferences, we find that the expected value of
. Equation (26) has two solutions. The one of interest, which delivers the stationary rational expectations equilibrium for all values of structural parameters and corresponds to the policy optimum, is in the unity circle and is given by
Using (27) 
Effects of opacity on macroeconomic performance under pre-commitment
Under perfect transparency, discretion leads to a stabilization bias and lower social welfare (in general) than under optimal pre-commitment in a timeless perspective (McCallum and Nelson, 2004) . In effect, under commitment, the central bank chooses, at time t, both current and expected future values of inflation and the output gap. Before comparing the effects of imperfect transparency across these two monetary policy regimes, we first explore its effects on the level and variance of inflation and the output gap under pre-commitment.
Deriving the level of inflation and the output gap given by (29)- (30) 
Proposition 6a. Under optimal pre-commitment in a timeless perspective, an increase in central bank opacity will generally reduce the dependence of inflation on the past output gap and increase that of the output gap.
A sufficient condition . The latter will be generally verified given that  is small and the central banker does not focus too strongly on the inflation target, implying that  is large. Furthermore, a lower initial degree of opacity will make the condition easier to be satisfied.
The results reported in Propositions 6a and 6b are explained by the inflation expectations channel. In effect, a decrease in transparency will reduce the reaction of expected inflation to the past output gap and inflation shocks. Lower inflation expectations will simultaneously allow reducing the responses of inflation and the output gap to inflation shocks. On the other hand, opacity has divergent effects on the dependence of inflation and the output gap on the past output gap because their dependence on the latter is inversely related according to the monetary policy rule under pre-commitment, i.e. equation (23).
We find that an increase in opacity will reduce the average reaction of inflation to inflation shocks if channel is generally larger than that through the inflation expectations channel. These marginal effects of opacity are amplified with a higher degree of persistence of inflation shocks but weakened by an increase in the initial degree of opacity. Thus, for plausible parameter values, an increase in opacity will amplify the average reactions of the output gap to inflation shocks and more so when the degree of persistence of inflation shocks is higher.
Proposition 6c. Under optimal pre-commitment in a timeless perspective, an increase in the central bank opacity will generally reduce (increase) the average reaction of current inflation (the current output gap) to inflation shocks. These marginal effects are reinforced (weakened) by an increase in the degree of persistence of inflation shocks (the initial degree of opacity).
Using (29) and (30) to compute the variances of inflation and the output gap respectively and then twice deriving them with respect to 2 1  t x and 2   yield:
where 2 2 6 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 ) (
Our numerical exercises show that the dependence of the volatility of inflation and the output gap on the past output gap is weakly affected by an increase in the degree of opacity 28 whatever is the initial degree of opacity. Furthermore, these effects are independent of the degree of persistence of inflation shocks.
Deriving the variances of inflation and the output gap with respect to 2 e  and 2   yields:
In (33) and (34), the first term represents the direct effect of opacity due to the impact of the central bank's preference shocks on the trade-off between inflation and the output gap (i.e., the slope of monetary policy rule) and hence on the level of inflation and the output gap.
Given that the value attributed to
 is quite small in the New Keynesian models, this implies that if the central bank assigns a sufficiently high weight to the output-gap stabilization, i.e. (from 0.3489 to 1.3138) when  passes from 0.1 to 0.99. A weak initial degree of opacity will significantly reinforce the above effects only if  is relatively high (see Table 1 , Section 5). For different initial degrees of opacity, the negative effects of opacity on the volatility of 30 inflation largely dominate its positive effects on the volatility of the output gap and the difference increases exponentially with the degree of persistence of inflation shocks. Here, similar to the case of optimal discretion, an increase in opacity decreases more the costs of achieving a higher output-gap when the trade-off between inflation and the output gap is high (i.e., when the inflation shock is more persistent) than when the trade-off is low (i.e., when the inflation shock is less persistent). It has thus large smoothing effects on inflation without significantly amplifying the fall in the output gap, once the effects of idiosyncratic preference shocks are also taken into account.
Effects of opacity on macroeconomic dynamics under pre-commitment
When studying the economic dynamics under discretion, we find that the dynamic system of the economy is affected by opacity through the inflation expectations channel while future inflation expectations are affected by the effects of central bank's preference shocks which modify the policy rule and hence the optimal trade-off between inflation and the output gap in all future periods. Under optimal pre-commitment, these dynamic effects are present but are affected by the pre-commitment of the monetary authority in a timeless perspective, which implies that the policy rule also depends on the past output gap.
Using equations (1) and (23), we write the dynamic system of expected future inflation and output gap in a matrix form as follows:
The eigenvalues of the stability matrix are given by 1 2
Following Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and King and Watson (1998) 
The partial derivative reported in (36) implies that the convergence speed of inflation expectations is clearly accelerated by a decrease in central bank transparency. Through the inflation expectations channel, opacity will increase the speed of convergence of inflation and the output gap for a given preference shock. As in the case of optimal discretion, when a large number of preference shocks occur during the transition to the equilibrium, to measure the dynamic effects on social welfare, one must compute the average reactions of inflation and the output gap to inflation shocks. Our previous analysis and simulation exercises imply that
, preference shocks will, on average, accelerate the adjustment of inflation but decrease in general that of the output gap during the dynamic adjustment (Figure 3 ).
Proposition 8.
Under optimal pre-commitment in a timeless perspective, an increase in opacity will accelerate the convergence of inflation expectations and current inflation to their equilibrium levels but will decrease the speed of convergence of the output gap.
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On balance, the dynamic costs for the society, in terms of higher volatility of the output gap due to the effect of preference shocks via the policy rule channel, could nevertheless be dominated by the dynamic benefits of opacity on social welfare through the inflation expectations channel (lower volatilities of inflation and the output gap) as well as through the policy rule channel (lower volatility of inflation) if the relative weight assigned to output-gap stabilization is low. This implies that the dynamic and static effects of decreased transparency could have significant differences under these two policy regimes.
Effects of opacity on macroeconomic volatility
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Comparing the volatilities of inflation and the output gap under these two policy regimes, we find that they reacts less to the volatility of inflation shocks under pre-commitment than under discretion if
In effect, as inflation shocks become more persistent, the discretion will perform less well in stabilizing inflation and the output gap since it becomes more difficult to surprise the private sector. However, the increase in inflation expectations due to higher degree of persistence of inflation shocks will augment the role of opacity. Under pre-commitment, inflation expectations are better anchored by the commitment to the inflation target.
Therefore, less transparency is more likely to have a large negative effect on inflation expectations under discretion than under pre-commitment when the degree of persistence of inflation shocks is high enough. For the same reason, the volatility of the output gap under discretion could be more amplified by an increase in the degree of persistence of inflation shocks than under pre-commitment. Thus, on balance, macroeconomic performance could be more improved by imperfect transparency under optimal pre-commitment than under optimal discretion.
The effects of opacity on the macroeconomic volatility crucially depend on the degree of persistence of inflation shocks but less significantly on the initial degree of opacity. Using The results are reported in Table 1 . They allow us to make several observations. First, the effects of an increase in opacity are not strongly affected by the change of the initial degree of 34 opacity when the degree of persistence of inflation shocks is low. In contrast, they are very sensitive to the degree of persistence of inflation shocks for a given initial degree of opacity. Second, under optimal discretion, even though an increase in opacity can reduce the volatility of inflation at low degrees of persistence, it can increase more significantly the volatility of the output gap. Thus, using the results reported in Table 1 , we find that for the benchmark parameter values used in our simulation exercises, an increase in opacity would actually decrease social welfare measured by (17) for low degree of persistence of inflation shocks (i.e., 433 . 0   ). In comparison, under optimal pre-commitment, using the same welfare measure, imperfect transparency always improves social welfare.
Third, Table 1 shows that, in absolute terms, the effects of opacity on the volatility of inflation and the output gap exponentially increase with the degree of persistence of inflation 35 shocks. When a low initial degree of opacity is combined with a high degree of persistence, an increase in opacity could significantly increase the social welfare.
Effects of opacity on macroeconomic dynamics
We have previously shown that decreased transparency accelerates the convergence of inflation expectations both under optimal discretion and optimal pre-commitment in a timeless perspective. Before discussing the dynamic adjustment of current inflation and output gap, we compare the effects of opacity on the dynamics of inflation expectations across the two policy regimes. We compare the acceleration of convergence first in absolute terms and then in relative terms.
Comparing (36) with (20) 
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Given that  is small, the central bank must be very conservative by assigning a very small weight (i.e. very low  ) to the output-gap stabilization for the right hand of (38) to be negative. On the contrary, if  is such that condition (38) is invalid, we then have to reject the case where inflation expectations adjust more rapidly in relative terms under precommitment than under discretion. In this case, as  is also the upper bound for the degree of opacity, this will reduce the possibility of any significant effect of opacity on the convergence of inflation expectations under these two policy regimes.
For a given preference shock, the dynamic adjustments of current inflation and output gap similarly depend on inflation expectations. The comparison of the effects of opacity through this channel on their dynamics across the two policy regimes do not straightforwardly lead to clear-cut conditions. Some simulation exercises show that generally, impacted by imperfect transparency, the speed of convergence of expected and current inflation and the output gap are largely high under optimal pre-commitment than under optimal discretion 
Conclusions
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In this paper, we have examined the issue of political transparency in a forward-looking New Keynesian model by considering the static and dynamic effects of the uncertainty affecting the weights that the central bank assigns to inflation and output-gap stabilization.
The effects of imperfect transparency vary significantly across policy regimes and are greatly dependent on the degree of persistence of inflation shocks.
Under optimal discretion, in the case where the shocks are serially uncorrelated, an increase in central bank opacity does not affect inflation expectations and hence has no effect on the level of inflation and the output gap through this channel, but reduces the average reaction of inflation and increases that of the output gap to inflation shocks through the policy rule channel, i.e., the direct effect of the central bank's preference shocks. It will decrease the volatility of inflation and will increase the volatility of the output gap if the output-gap elasticity of inflation is sufficiently low with respect to the average weight assigned by the central bank to the output-gap target. This is generally true given that the output-gap elasticity of inflation is quite small in the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
In the event of serially correlated inflation shocks, an increase in the persistence of inflation shocks reinforces the attenuation effects of central bank opacity on inflation and the output gap through the inflation expectations channel. On the other hand, higher persistence of inflation shocks will reduce (reinforce) the attenuation (amplification) effect of opacity through the policy rule channel on the average reaction of inflation (the output gap) to inflation shocks. On balance, when the persistence of inflation shocks is high, imperfect transparency could significantly improve social welfare if the weight assigned by the society to output-gap stabilization is relatively low.
Under optimal pre-commitment in a timeless perspective, a decrease in transparency reduces the dependence of inflation on the past output gap and increases that of the output gap 38 if the weight assigned by the central bank to output-gap stabilization is relatively low. It reduces the sensitivity of inflation and the output gap to inflation shocks as under a discretionary policy regime. Optimal pre-commitment allows for larger attenuation effects of imperfect transparency on the average reaction of inflation to inflation shocks than under discretion when the degree of persistence is relatively low. In contrast, the amplification effect of opacity on the average reaction of the output gap is always smaller under pre-commitment than under discretion. Therefore, imperfect transparency under pre-commitment is more likely to improve social welfare by reducing the volatility of inflation more than under optimal discretion, except for very high degree of persistence of inflation shocks, and by increasing much less the volatility of the output gap than under discretion whatever are the initial degrees of opacity and inflation persistence.
Finally, imperfect transparency has similar dynamic effects across policy regimes. More central bank opacity does not modify the dynamic stability nature of the equilibrium but will accelerate the speed of convergence of inflation expectations. Imperfect transparency clearly accelerates through this channel, for a given preference shock, the speed of convergence of inflation and the output gap to their equilibrium levels compared with the benchmark of full transparency. These effects are to some extent mitigated by the direct effects of central bank's idiosyncratic preference shocks which accelerate the average dynamic adjustment of inflation but amplify the average divergence of the output gap from its equilibrium value. On balance, it is more probable under pre-commitment than under discretion that greater central bank opacity could improve social welfare in dynamic terms if the relative weight assigned by the society to output-gap stabilization is low.
